Thaddeus Thomas v. Governor of New Jersey by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-15-2016 
Thaddeus Thomas v. Governor of New Jersey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Thaddeus Thomas v. Governor of New Jersey" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 677. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/677 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 14-4526 
__________ 
 
THADDEUS JAMES THOMAS; RONALD NASH 
 
 v. 
 
 CHRISTOPHER CHRISTIE, Individually and in his capacity as Governor,  
PAULA T. DOW, ESQ. Individually and in her capacity as Attorney General;   
GARY M. LANIGAN; Individually and in his capacity as Commissioner of the 
Department of Human Service; JENNIFER VELEZ, ESQ. Individually and in her 
capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Human Services; JOHN MAIN, 
Individually and in his capacity as Director of the Department of Human Services;  
JONATHAN POAG, Individually and in his capacity as Director of the Division of 
Mental Health Services a/k/a the Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services; 
MERRILL MAIN, Individually and in her capacity as Clinical Director of the Special 
Treatment Unit Annex; SHANTAY BRAIM ADAMS, Individually and in her capacity 
as  Assistant Director of the Special Treatment Unit Annex; JACKIE OTTINO, 
Individually and in her capacity as Program Coordinator of the Special Treatment Unit 
Annex;  JOHN/JANE DOES, 1-10, Individually and in their official capacities 
 
 
 Gary Lanigan; Jennifer Velez; John Main; Jonathan Poag,  
 Merrill Main; Shantay Braim Adams; Jackie Ottino, 
                                                                                         Appellants 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court Civil Nos.  2-10-cv-02113, 2-10-cv-05026) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise 
 
Argued September 9, 2015 
 
BEFORE:  VANASKIE, NYGAARD, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
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(Filed: July 15, 2016) 
 
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey 
David L. DaCosta, Esquire [Argued] 
Daniel M. Vannella, Esquire 
Theodore F. Martens, III, Esquire 
Office of Attorney General of New Jersey 
25 Market Street 
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 
Trenton, NJ 08625 
 
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
 
Lawrence S. Lustberg, Esquire 
Ana I. Munoz, Esquire [Argued] 
Gibbons 
One Gateway Center 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
 Counsel for Appellee Thaddeus James Thomas 
 
Michael R. Yellin, Esquire 
Cole Schotz 
25 Main Street 
Court Plaza North, P.O. Box 800 
Hackensack, NJ 07601 
  
 Counsel for Appellee Ronald Nash 
 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
____________________ 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellants Gary Lanigan, Jennifer Velez, John Main, Jonathan Poag, Merrill 
Main, Shantay Braim Adams, and Jackie Ottino assert that the District Court erred by 
failing to grant them qualified immunity—raised in their motion to dismiss—in a suit by 
Thaddeus James Thomas and Ronald Nash, who are civilly committed under the New 
Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act.  N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to 27.38.1  Plaintiffs raise 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims.  We will affirm the order of the District 
Court denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss. 
 We have jurisdiction to review final decisions of a district court.  28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  However, we also have jurisdiction to hear appeals where a district court’s order 
“finally determine[s] claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in 
the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to 
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”  
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).  We can review an 
order denying a claim of qualified immunity because it puts at stake the Appellants’ 
entitlement “not to be forced to litigate the consequences of official conduct” and it is 
therefore considered “conceptually distinct” from the merits of the action.  Mitchell v. 
____________________ 
 
1On October 15, 2010, the District Court associated the cases brought by Thomas and 
Nash and the October 20, 2014 order appealed from applied to both cases.  The appeal of 
that order has been docketed under one case number.   
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Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 527-28 (1985).2  Nonetheless, we do not review the accuracy of 
the plaintiff’s statement of facts, nor do we even decide if the plaintiff has actually stated 
a claim.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985).  Rather, our jurisdiction extends 
only to consider an issue of law, including:  “whether the legal norms allegedly violated 
by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions.”  Id. 
 Appellants raise such an issue of law on appeal.  However, citing to Rouse, they 
contend more pointedly that the District Court erred by failing to conduct a “highly 
individualized inquiry” to determine whether Thomas and Nash properly pleaded the 
violations of a clearly established constitutional right.  Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 
200 (3d Cir. 1999).  They maintain that the District Court did not identify or address the 
particular conduct of each Appellant that allegedly violated Appellees’ liberty interests. 
 A plaintiff must present enough facts about the conduct of each defendant to show 
that it is plausible that each defendant, individually, violated a clearly established right.  
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.  However, Rouse’s notion of a “highly individualized inquiry” 
arose in the context of summary judgment, and its application to the analysis of a District 
____________________ 
 
2 We note a conflict in the District Court’s memorandum opinion in this regard.  It states:  
“this Court concludes that, at this juncture, the DOC Defendants are not entitled to 
qualified immunity.”  J.A. 59.  This suggests a decision that could be revisited at a later 
point in the litigation.  However, on the same page, the District Court implicitly certifies 
the qualified immunity issue for appeal, communicating its view that the denial of their 
qualified immunity is, indeed, final.   Given the District Court’s thorough analysis of 
issues at hand and obvious command of applicable law, we will interpret the District 
Court’s act of certifying this interlocutory appeal as expressing its intent to treat the 
denial of qualified immunity as a final disposition on the issue. 
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Court’s denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be interpreted as imposing a heightened 
pleading standard.3  Rule 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).  As Iqbal elaborated:  
[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged. 
 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(internal citations omitted).  This is true as to 
each Appellant.  However, the District Court makes its determination of plausibility by 
drawing inferences from the facts pleaded using its experience and common sense.  
Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, 643 F.3d 60, 69 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 Appellants do not challenge the District Court’s determination that the New Jersey 
Sexually Violent Predator Act created a liberty interest rooted in a mentally disabled 
prisoner’s right to receive mental health treatment.  Appellants also agree with the 
District Court that Thomas and Nash did not plead a violation of that right through 
respondeat superior liability.  Rather this appeal centers on the District Court’s 
conclusion that the complaints adequately plead claims that Appellants’ policy decisions 
____________________ 
 
3“[T]he question is whether a reasonable public official would know that his or her 
specific conduct violated clearly established rights. . . .Thus, crucial to the resolution of 
any assertion of qualified immunity is a careful examination of the record . . . to establish, 
for purposes of summary judgment, a detailed factual description of the actions of each 
individual defendant. . . . ”  Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Grant v. City of Pittsburgh,, 98 F.3d 116, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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(specifically those that ultimately were the moving force behind changes in and/or denial 
of Thomas’ and Nash’s prescribed medical care for non-medical reasons) violated their 
liberty interests.4  
 The Supreme Court noted that a core concept “animating” the qualified immunity 
doctrine is whether each “official’s duties legitimately require action” implicating clearly 
established rights.  Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 819 (1982)).  The District Court correctly reasoned from our precedent that the 
standard for holding officials liable in their individual capacity for deliberately indifferent 
wrongs is whether there is at least circumstantial evidence to plausibly infer that: 
(a) [the] supervising officials make systemwide 
determinations; (b) these determinations become the moving 
force behind the circumstances under which the subordinate 
officers effectively have no choice but to deny/reduce/change 
an inmate’'s prescribed medical/mental treatment for non-
medical reasons; and (c) such denial/reduction/change in 
prescribed treatment was foreseeable under the systemwide 
determinations the supervisors made. 
 
____________________ 
 
4The District Court noted that Thomas and Nash alleged their mental health treatment had 
been consistently maintained for approximately ten years at the Kearney, New Jersey 
facility.  The District Court inferred that ten years of consistent therapy reasonably 
implied a prescribed treatment, rather than simply a random program.  Thomas and Nash 
further alleged that their treatment was abruptly altered after their transfer to the East 
Jersey State Prison special housing unit.  Thomas claims that treatment was completely 
curtailed because construction in the segregated housing unit in which he was housed 
prevented allocation of any space to conduct his treatments.  The District Court inferred 
from this that Thomas and Nash were pleading that the change in treatment was not 
grounded in any medical reason. 
 
7 
 
J.A. 43-44 (citing Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993); White v. 
Napolean, 897 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990); Brown v. Plata 563 U.S. 493 (2011); and Leamer 
v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2002)).   
 Appellants are convinced that Thomas and Nash did not sufficiently plead such 
facts because the complaints do not allege the particular acts of each that violated that 
right.  Appellants also maintain that the District Court glossed over this shortcoming of 
the complaints by making impermissible references to sources outside the complaints, 
and by referring to the Appellants generically as “DOC defendants.”  In particular, 
Appellants point to the District Court’s discussion of N.J. Stat. Ann. 30:4-27.34,5 a 
particular executive order of Governor Whitman’s (Executive Order 118), and the ruling 
in County of Hudson v. State Dept. of Correction, (2009 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 1188, 
at *2-16), contending that these (rather than the pleadings) grounded the District Court’s 
____________________ 
 
5 “ a. The Department of Corrections shall be responsible for the operation of any facility 
designated for the custody, care and treatment of sexually violent predators, and shall 
provide or arrange for custodial care of persons committed pursuant to this act. Except as 
may be provided pursuant to subsection c. of section 9 of this act, a person committed 
pursuant to this act shall be kept in a secure facility and shall be housed and managed 
separately from offenders in the custody of the Department of Corrections and, except for 
occasional instances of supervised incidental contact, shall be segregated from such 
offenders.  b. The Division of Mental Health Services in the Department of Human 
Services shall provide or arrange for treatment for a person committed pursuant to this 
act. Such treatment shall be appropriately tailored to address the specific needs of 
sexually violent predators.  c. Appropriate representatives of the Department of 
Corrections and the Department of Human Services shall participate in an interagency 
oversight board to facilitate the coordination of the policies and procedures of the 
facility.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.34. 
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inferences that led it to conclude that the constitutional right was clearly established here.  
We disagree. 
 As the District Court stated, Thomas and Nash have pleaded that each official’s 
“own decisions and acts” causally connected Appellants to the reduction or elimination of 
prescribed treatment.  J.A. 51.  Towards this end, they state each Appellant’s job title 
within the Department of Corrections and Department of Human Services (J.A. 15-16), 
and they specify the particular types of policy decision and rulemaking responsibilities 
each had that was relevant to the housing and care of Thomas and Nash.6  Moreover, the 
pleadings focus upon disruptions in treatment occurring after Thomas and Nash were 
transferred from the Kearney facility to the East Jersey State Prison, inextricably 
intertwining the constitutional violation claims about treatment disruptions with policy 
decisions concerning the transfer.7   
____________________ 
 
6The complaint averred the following responsibilities:  Gary Lanigan—determining all 
matters of policy and rules for state Department of Corrections civil commitment 
facilities and policy and procedures of Department of Corrections staff; Jennifer Velez—
determining matters of policy and rules governing state mental health facilities and 
developing and implementing treatment plans; John Main—determining policy and rules 
governing mental health facilities developing and implementing treatment plans; 
Jonathan Poag—developing and providing operational support for state mental health 
facilities, supervising Department of Human Services staff at civil commitment facilities, 
and developing and implementing treatment plans for civilly committed residents.  Merril 
Main—treatment planning and administration of Special Treatment Units.  Shantay 
Braim Adams—treatment planning and administration of Special Treatment Units.  
Jackie Ottino—treatment planning and administration of Special Treatment Units.   J.A. 
88-89.   
7
 See supra, note 4. 
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 The District Court’s review of the complaints highlights the rather unique 
alignment between the specific right at issue and the particular decision-making 
responsibilities of each Appellant that enabled it to reach a conclusion about whether the 
right was clearly established.  The District Court noted that Thomas and Nash were 
pleading that a subset of the decisions these officials made were at issue—those related to 
the movement of the sexually violent predator program from Kearney to East Jersey State 
Prison.  It said “the decisions and acts at issue, by their very nature, could not have 
possibly escaped the scope of the DOC defendants’ personal responsibilities.”8  J.A. 51-
52.  Given the alignment between the distinct scope of decisions at issue and Appellants’ 
job responsibilities, this is a reasonable inference. 
 Moreover, the District Court viewed the liberty interest at issue to be well defined, 
saying that this constitutional right is “scalpel-narrow” and has been the subject of 
extensive “practical guidance” for over a decade.  J.A. 57.  Therefore, as to these 
officials, and this subset of decisions concerning the management of the sexually violent 
predator program, it was reasonable for the District Court to conclude that Appellants had 
“fair warning” of the constitutional implications of any decision foreseeably resulting in 
____________________ 
 
8We do not attach significance to the District Court’s reference to “DOC defendants.”  
Although this short-hand reference was technically inaccurate, the District Court was 
plainly aware that Appellants were officials from different parts of state government with 
different responsibilities.  J.A. 15-16. 
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“denying, reducing or changing Plaintiffs' prescribed mental treatment for non-medical 
reasons.”  Id. 9 
 To the extent that the District Court’s review of the statute, executive order, and 
state court case were relevant to its qualified immunity analysis, these judicially 
cognizable sources underscored the reasonableness of the District Court’s conclusions.  
The District Court’s reading of the statute was consistent with the pleadings alleging each 
official’s responsibilities.  Moreover, the Executive Order and the ensuing decade-long 
litigation over the location of the sexually violent predator program provided further 
evidence that the state government was engaged in decision making, consistent with the 
pleadings, that was directly relevant to the housing and treatment of both Thomas and 
Nash, sexually violent predators who have been detained at the facilities at the center of 
the Executive Order and state court case.10  We do not regard these sources as the 
foundation of the District Court’s qualified immunity analysis.  But, there is no doubt that 
they support the reasonableness of the District Court’s conclusion that the complaints 
plausibly pleaded sufficient facts suggesting that each official violated a clearly 
____________________ 
 
9 Evidence that the District Court was aware that the pleadings were not (as Appellants 
allege) so vague that any state official could be ascribed responsibility is found in the fact 
that it dismissed Governor Christie and Attorney General Dow from the suit because the 
pleadings failed to “nudge [their] claims [enough to] cross the line from conceivable to 
plausible.”   J.A. 52 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-81). 
10 “[T]his Court has no reason to conclude that the already-adjudicated fact of the decade-
long focused search/decision-making as to the facility where Plaintiffs would be placed 
(as well as Defendants' more-than-a-year-long focused process of supervising preparation 
and fixing the SHU) fails to show personal involvement of Defendants in the wrongs 
alleged here.”  J.A.  51, n. 35. 
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established right.  Therefore, the District Court correctly concluded that Appellants’ 
claim of qualified immunity failed. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.   
